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This research aims to examine how the prior experiences of the chief executive
officer (CEO) and board influence the focal firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
activities. Further, the present study examines how CEO overconfidence influences the
diffusion of CSR activities. The authors theorize that overconfident CEOs are influenced
more by the corporate strategies they experienced on other boards and less by the
corporate strategies experienced by other directors. Through longitudinal analyses of
the CSR profiles a sample of S&P 500 companies for the period 2006-2013, the study
shows that CEO and board prior CSR experience are positively related to the firm’s
current CSR activities. The authors find a significant positive moderating effect of CEO
overconfidence on the relationship between CEO prior CSR and the focal firm’s CSR.
The theory and results highlight how CEO and board prior CSR exposure may influence
the focal firm’s stances toward CSR and that CEO overconfidence may have differential
effects on these relationships.
Keywords: CEO prior CSR, board prior CSR, CEO overconfidence, CEO interests, firm’s CSR

INTRODUCTION
One outcome of the increasing levels of social awareness and domestic activism in the United States
and worldwide is that corporations are becoming increasingly aware of and concerned about their
CSR image (Rodriguez-Fernandez, 2016; Banerjee, 2018). Perhaps as a result of previous public
relations failures and the mistakes of a previous generation of managers, current managers seem
more motivated than ever to use public CSR activities to improve the public’s perceptions about
corporate managers (Schrempf-Stirling et al., 2016). As part of that effort, corporate managers are
allocating more resources to CSR activities and being more deliberate when communicating their
CSR commitment to stockholders, stakeholders, and the public at large.
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literature provides an abundance of evidence that individuals
tend to overestimate their personal abilities. provides an
abundance of that -on average- people overvalue their own
abilities (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Aabo and Eriksen, 2018).
Chief executive officer’s may be more inclined to suffer from
overconfidence bias than others because this problem is more
common among talented individuals (Moore and Cain, 2007;
Hogarth and Karelaia, 2012). Overconfidence affects the way
that business leaders perceive phenomena, treat people, interpret
information, and act upon these interpretations (Galasso and
Simcoe, 2011; Chen et al., 2015). The more overconfident the
CEO, the more likely the CEO will be to value their prior
experiences and commit to their own beliefs and ignore or
override the beliefs of others who might hold different beliefs
(Zhu and Chen, 2015; Schoenherr et al., 2018). In light of these
potential effects, a second objective of our study is to examine
how CEO overconfidence effects the relationships between past
CSR experiences of both the CEO and board members and
current CSR policies of the focal firm.
Our study contributes to both the upper echelons theory and
the research on CSR in several ways. First, we advance upper
echelons theory by moving from coarse-grained demographic
proxies to more fine-grained aspects of executive experience by
specifically examining prior CSR experience and exposure of
the key decision makers, both the CEO and members of the
board of directors. Second, we contribute to CSR research by
examining how CEO overconfidence, a salient internal driver,
may affect how CEOs might overvalue/undervalue their own
experiences and those of the board members. In doing so, we
advance the literature on the factors that affect the extent to
which CEOs might engage in CSR in their focal firms using their
prior CSR experiences as an important driver. Additionally, we
examine CEO overconfidence as an important contingency that
may influence the extent to which CEO prior experiences may
affect the focal firm’s CSR. Lastly, we also examine the effects of
prior experiences of the board and the extent to which it might be
influenced by the CEO overconfidence.

Greater CSR focus within corporations has been paralleled
by correspondingly greater prominence of CSR in the academic
literature (Hoffmann, 2018). Not surprisingly, much of the initial
focus of CSR research debated the effects on CSR activities on the
firm’s financial performance. Despite the large number of studies
on the relationship between CSR and firm performance, recent
reviews have concluded that the exact nature of this relationship
remains ambiguous and inconclusive (McWilliams and Siegel,
2000; Gras-Gil et al., 2016; Mellahi et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016).
A second key focus in the literature has been on the
antecedents of CSR initiatives. The examination of CSR
antecedents has focused mostly on external factors that motivate
managers and their organizations to engage in certain activities
that are meant as responses to the demands of multiple
stakeholders (Yang and Rivers, 2009; Othman et al., 2011; Lee
et al., 2018; Scheidler et al., 2019). Considerable research has
focused on stakeholder pressures and activism as major forces
driving firms’ increasing attention to CSR (Doh and Guay,
2006; Wolf, 2014; Uldam and Hansen, 2017). Other studies have
examined external factors such as the effects of legal mandates
(Foote, 1984; Amor-Esteban et al., 2018), institutional pressure
(Yang and Rivers, 2009; Young and Makhija, 2014), and industry
and competition (Kim et al., 2018; Gras and Krause, 2020).
More recently, the focus on CSR antecedents has begun to
shift from contextual variables to within firm variables (Chin
et al., 2013; Cook and Glass, 2018). This stream of inquiry builds
heavily on (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) upper echelons theory
which posits that attributes of the top management team, and the
CEO in particular, are key drivers of the firm’s decision process.
More specifically, Hambrick and Mason (1984) contended that
the personality of the top executives, the implicit knowledge
that they have accumulated over years of experiences, and their
prior experiences impact the way they perceive and process
information and, ultimately, the decisions they make. Despite the
attention that upper echelons theory has received, surprisingly
little attention has been paid either to the CEO’s or to the board’s
prior CSR experience. CEOs as well as the board members are
key decision makers in organizations, and their prior experiences
can significantly influence their decisions and shape their actions
(Weng and Lin, 2014; Zhu and Westphal, 2014; Hamori and
Koyuncu, 2015; Le and Kroll, 2017). Thus, a primary objective of
the current effort is to focus directly on how prior CSR experience
influences the upper echelon’s current CSR strategies.
More attention has been focused on the personality traits of
chief executive officers. Of the many personality dimensions,
CEO overconfidence has drawn increasing attention from
strategy researchers in recent years (Schumacher et al., 2020).
Overconfidence is typically associated with single-mindedness,
entitlement, and a sense of superiority (Engelen et al., 2015; Bi
et al., 2016; Tenney et al., 2019). Overconfidence is also associated
with three different behavioral manifestations: overprecision
which refers to inflated confidence in the accuracy of one’s beliefs,
overplacement which refers to an inflated perception of one’s
individual characteristics relative to others, and overestimation
which refers to an inflated view of one’s ability, performance,
success, and/or control of events (Moore and Healy, 2008;
Macenczak et al., 2016; Schumacher et al., 2020). The psychology
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
There is considerable evidence that top managers’, and especially
CEOs’, characteristics have significant effects on the decisionmaking processes inside organizations, and thus on the
organization’s strategies and outcomes (Hambrick, 2007; Quigley
and Hambrick, 2015; Petrenko et al., 2016). Key CEO
characteristics include age (Zhang et al., 2016; Belenzon et al.,
2019), tenure (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Boling et al., 2016;
Oh et al., 2018), educational background (King et al., 2016; Wang
and Yin, 2018), and functional background (Koyuncu et al.,
2010; Buyl et al., 2011). Such characteristics are influential in
determining key strategic outcomes and policies including R&D
spending (Barker and Mueller, 2002; Gwynne, 2003), voluntary
environmental information disclosure (Lewis et al., 2014), risk
taking and entrepreneurial orientation (Cao et al., 2015; Oesterle
et al., 2016), and organizational culture (Giberson et al., 2009).
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through which organizational change occurs (Boeker, 1997a).
When top managers move between organizations, they are likely
to fall back on information and insights gained through their
prior experience when making strategic decisions at the focal
firm. In fact, CEOs with prior experiences are often hired to
replicate their success in prior positions. Such CEOs are likely to
have greater freedom and face less resistance when implementing
strategies that are influenced by their past experiences (Hamori
and Koyuncu, 2015). These successful executives are more likely
than others to view themselves as superior, right, and more
intelligent, and therefore are more likely to draw on their
previously developed paradigms or knowledge base when making
organizational decisions (John and Robins, 1994; Reina et al.,
2014).
An executive’s prior experiences also facilitate information
processing and generating alternatives for formulating strategic
plans for the focal firm (Weng and Lin, 2014). The availability
of relevant prior knowledge, exposure, and experience makes it
more likely that decisions concerning certain situations will be
biased and influenced by the relevant accumulated knowledge
from prior experiences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) because
managers develop scripts and schema over time. These scripts
are influenced by prior experience in similar circumstances,
increasing the likelihood of adopting similar strategies in the
future (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick et al., 1993;
Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001).
Finally, when executives encounter highly uncertain decision
settings, they typically have one of two responses. They may
imitate what others firms are doing (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983) or, more likely, they will draw on experience and repeat
what they did when faced with similar situations in the past.
Decisions on CSR involve considerable uncertainty. Managers
are often uncertain about the types of CSR activities to engage
in and the amount of resources to devote to each activity.
Additional uncertainty surrounds the performance outcomes
and stakeholder reactions to various CSR activities (McWilliams
and Siegel, 2000; Lepoutre et al., 2007). Given the uncertainties
relating to activities and outcomes, it is only to be expected
that CEOs and board members will draw from their scripts
and prior experiences when considering strategic decisions (Zhu
and Chen, 2015). For example, directors who have been part
of a previous firm’s decision to dedicate more resources to
engage in CSR activities such as charitable contributions, building
facilities for local communities, and promoting environmentfriendly policies will be favorably disposed toward such activities
as strategies to achieve greater access to external resources, better
image, and improved public relations. Therefore, they will be
more likely to lean toward using the same strategies at their
current firm because they are familiar and comfortable with such
practices. Given that CEOs and Directors develop preferences
toward strategies that they have experienced at other firms, CSR
exposure at other firms is highly likely to be a primary factor
that affects the focal firm’s CSR commitment. Therefore, we
hypothesize:

These individual characteristics are important because the
strategic decision-making process is complex and ambiguous.
TMT perceptions and interpretations become critical in this
process (Dutton and Duncan, 1987a,b). Executives use their
personalized interpretations of the circumstances they encounter,
and these personalized interpretations are a function of the
executives’ prior experiences, beliefs, values, and personality traits
(Hambrick, 2007). We investigate the how the interplay between
executive experience and executive personality influence CSR
strategy. Specifically, we examine the moderating effect of CEO
overconfidence on the relationship between CEO prior CSR
exposure and the focal firm’s level of CSR, and the moderating
effect of CEO overconfidence on the relationship between board
prior CSR experience and the focal firm’s level of CSR.

Prior Experience and Corporate Social
Responsibility
Executives develop personal views and beliefs across their careers
through accumulated experiences (Carpenter et al., 2004). The
accumulation of prior experiences results in the development of
what (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) labeled the CEO paradigm.
A key outcome of this paradigm is that the CEO’s beliefs and
assumptions serve as “perceptual and interpretive apparatuses”
for seeing a firm and its environment (Hambrick and Fukutomi,
1991: p. 721). This paradigm evolves over time and becomes
the CEO’s knowledge base upon which they develop their beliefs
and make decisions (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Thus,
executives’ experiences and personalities impact subsequent
strategic decisions and actions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984;
Hambrick, 2007; Bailey, 2009).
By extension, we argue that a parallel set of processes
are common across all upper-level executives including, in
the current context, members of the Board of Directors.
Board members also develop an appreciation for prior roles
and experiences at other firms and are influenced by such
experiences when participating in decisions at their current
firms (Westphal and Milton, 2000; Whitler et al., 2018).
Thus, like CEOs, Directors’ decisions about actions, decisions,
and initiatives when responding to stakeholders’ demands are
tied to beliefs that were developed from prior experiences
(Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001).
Prior research on strategic decision making confirms that
strategic choices are greatly influenced by managers’ personal
backgrounds and prior experiences (Boeker, 1997b; Geletkanycz
and Hambrick, 1997; Westphal and Milton, 2000; Zhu and
Westphal, 2014) and that these prior experiences and exposures
include serving as CEOs or board members (Zhu and Chen,
2015). The influence of prior experiences is particularly salient
when executives face decision contexts similar to those they faced
in previous firms (Useem, 1979; Haunschild, 1993; Westphal
et al., 2001). Drawing on prior experiences enables executives
and their organizations to gain legitimacy and reduce search and
experimentation costs (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
There are numerous factors that contribute to the importance
that executive experience plays in executive decisions. Executive
migration between firms is one of the primary mechanisms

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Hypothesis 1. Prior CSR experiences of the CEO at other
firms will be positively related to the focal firm’s CSR.

3

July 2022 | Volume 13 | Article 891331

Al-Shammari et al.

Effect of CEO/Board Prior CSR

Hypothesis 2. Prior CSR experiences of the board members
at other firms will be positively related to the focal firm’s CSR.

likely to be confident about their superior interpretation and
understanding of strategic actions based on their prior exposure
to such actions in other firms because they are more likely to
feel superior to others (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; O’Reilly
and Hall, 2021). When overconfident CEOs have been exposed
to strong CSR activities and strong commitment toward societal
and environmental concerns, they are confident about how to
successfully engage in similar initiatives and strategies in their
current firms. Therefore, both the motivational and cognitive
elements of overconfidence suggest that the inclination of the
CEO to pursue similar levels of CSR activities experienced in
their previous firms is likely to be even stronger when the CEO
is overconfident.

The Moderating Effect of Chief Executive
Officer Overconfidence
Overconfidence is one of the most studied CEO personality traits
(Malmendier et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2015; Engelen et al., 2015;
Aghazadeh et al., 2018). Prior research has documented that
overconfident CEOs exhibit demonstrably different behaviors
relative to other CEOs. For example, overconfident CEOs have
stronger tendencies toward bold actions and risky strategies
(Goel and Thakor, 2008; Bi et al., 2016; Aghazadeh et al.,
2018), because they believe that they have more skills and a
superior knowledge and experience compared to other CEOs.
Overconfident CEOs believe that they have a superior ability to
perform better and above average when making their investment
policies, often leading to overinvestment (Ho et al., 2016). These
behavioral differences have performance implication; firms run
by overconfident CEOs have extreme and unstable financial
performance (Andriosopoulos et al., 2013).
Because of their firm beliefs in their abilities and knowledge,
as well as their commitment to optimism about their prior
experiences, we argue that overconfident CEOs are more likely
to be influenced by their prior experiences at other firms (either
as CEO or as a board member). We contend that the motivational
and cognitive elements of excessive confidence will play a role
in explaining the degree to which overconfident CEOs will be
influenced by prior experiences (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007,
2011; Zhu and Chen, 2015). The motivational aspect of excessive
confidence suggests that such CEOs will interpret their prior
behavior and actions more positively (Farwell and WohlwendLloyd, 1998; Heimeriks, 2010) and even more positively when
their behavior is highly publicly observable (Wallace and
Baumeister, 2002a,b; Gerstner et al., 2013). Strategic initiatives
and actions of firms are attributed to the CEO by the public
and therefore such attention makes the CEO the public face of
the firm. Similarly, it is unlikely that an overconfident CEO will
interpret his or her prior behavior at other firms in a negative
light. Such an interpretation would conflict with the current
firm’s confidence in the CEO and would be inconsistent with the
CEO’s self-esteem, self-admiration and it also (Campbell et al.,
2004). These arguments are supported by the literature which
suggests that overconfident CEOs are more likely than others to
believe in the appropriateness of their prior behaviors, actions,
and strategies (Heimeriks, 2010; Zhu and Chen, 2015).
The cognitive aspect of overconfidence suggests that
overconfident CEOs believe that they have superior skills and
abilities and a strong belief in their intelligence and proficiencies
(John and Robins, 1994; Farwell and Wohlwend-Lloyd, 1998;
Campbell et al., 2004; Wales et al., 2013). Their pursuit of
prestige and uniqueness requires that they maintain such
confidence and self-admiration (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011;
Wales et al., 2013). They believe that they learn better than
others (Moore and Cain, 2007; Heimeriks, 2010; Chen et al.,
2015), and have stronger entitlement to their personal views
(Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Campbell et al., 2004). They are

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

Hypothesis 3: CEO overconfidence will positively moderate
the relationship between the CEO’s prior CSR experiences at
other firms and the focal firm’s overall CSR.
Prior research suggests that a firm’s strategies are generally
influenced by the prior experiences of top executives and
directors at other firms and that these experiences result in
the development of particular interpretations regarding specific
corporate strategies (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Wales
et al., 2013). The more overconfident an individual is, the
less likely he or she is to accept criticism, opinions of others,
or be influenced by others (Moore and Healy, 2008; Chu,
2012). Therefore, the more overconfident the CEO, the less
likely the CEO will be influenced by other board members’
prior experiences (Zhu and Chen, 2015). People with excessive
confidence are likely to dominate the decision-making process
because of their need to assert their superiority and because
of their overconfidence in their intelligence capabilities. In
work settings such individuals tend to neglect other team
members’ expertise in the decision-making processes (Campbell
and Campbell, 2009; Campbell et al., 2011). Thus, extremely
confident CEOs will project and assert their views, opinions, and
beliefs through their interactions with other top management
members, including members of the board. Further, the more
overconfident the CEO is, the less likely that he or she will see
as valuable other directors’ different experiences relative to a
decision about any corporate strategy (Rhodes and Wood, 1992).
Therefore, we propose overconfident CEOs will ignore the views
of directors who are not in support of CSR and favor those
members with positive prior CSR experiences.
Hypothesis 4: CEO overconfidence will negatively moderate
the relationship between board prior CSR experiences and
the focal firm’s overall CSR.

METHODOLOGY
Sample of Study
The initial sample for this study was the S&P 500 for the period
2006-2013. This includes both manufacturing and service firms.
The use of S&P 500 firms as the sample for the study facilitates
tracking the records of the directors’ prior appointments at other
firms. From the original list of 500 firms, we identified firms in
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by 1, 2/3, and 1/3 for the year’s t-1, t-2, and t-3, respectively,
to account for recency (e.g., Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997;
Zhu and Chen, 2015) because recent experiences may have larger
influences on subsequent decisions.

which the same CEO had remained in office during the entire
period of the study.
Data relating to firms’ CSR activities were collected from
the KLD database. In recent years, KLD has been the primary
source of data for research on CSR activities of publicly traded
firms because it is available for an extended period of time on
a consistent basis. The results reported by the KLD specialists
contain strengths and concerns in seven subject areas: human
rights, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, the
environment, product characteristics, and community relations.
The fact that these firms are rated by independent analysts adds
to the credibility and the quality of the data (Hillman and Keim,
2001; Hong and Andersen, 2011).
Firms for which full CSR data was not available for the
entire period were excluded from the study. We paid particular
attention to the year in which the CEO became the chief executive
officer and the year the members of the board had joined the
firm to calculate the score of their prior CSR exposure. We
excluded firms for which the CEO overconfidence measurement
had incomplete or unavailable data. Our final sample consisted of
240 firms for the period 2006-2013, yielding 1338 observations.
We used Mergent-online database to collect data regarding
CEO profiles and firm’s annual reports. We collected
compensation data came from Execucomp. Press and media
reports were collected from Factiva. Financial data were
obtained from Compustat.

Moderator: Chief Executive Officer Overconfidence
Chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence was measured
based on how a CEO exercises stock options. Data were
collected from the Execucomp database. Prior research on
CEO overconfidence suggests that a CEO who retains more
unexercised exercisable options is more confident about the
future of the firm (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Following
previous studies (Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Lee et al., 2017), we
first divided the annual value of the CEO’s holdings of vested,
in-the-money options by the CEO’s total salary and bonus. We
then applied a natural logarithmic transformation to the result to
normalize the distribution of the measure.

Control Variables
We controlled for CEO tenure, natural logarithm of number
of years as the CEO at the current firm, and CEO age, natural
logarithm of a CEO’s biological age. We also controlled for
several firm-level factors to increase the rigor of our findings.
We controlled for firm financial performance operationalized as
natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q. We controlled for a company’s
age as the years since the firm first appeared in the Compustat
data. We controlled for firm size, measured as the natural log
of the firm’s total assets. The firm leverage is the summation
of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by
total assets. We controlled for firm slack as it has a direct
influence on CEO preferences of both market and non-market
strategies (Seifert et al., 2004; Julian and Ofori-dankwa, 2013).
Consistent with prior studies, we calculated firm slack as the
cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets (Vanacker et al.,
2017). Capital intensity is calculated as capital expenditures
divided by sales. R&D (advertisement) intensity is computed
as R&D (advertisement) expenditures scaled by total assets.
Missing information on R&D expenditures and advertisement
expenditures is a well-known issue in Compustat. Hence,
following existing literature (Edmans et al., 2013; Koh and Reeb,
2015), we treat missing R&D expenditures and advertisement
expenditures as zero and include dummy variables that pick-up
the value 1 if non-missing data and 0 otherwise. We included year
dummies and SIC two-digit industry dummies in all our models.

Measures
Dependent Variable: Overall Corporate Social
Responsibility
The KLD data comprises of two indices, one for the company’s
strengths and the other for the company’s concerns. We
operationalized the overall CSR score of the focal firm as the sum
of strengths in the following dimensions (employee relations,
community relations, environment, diversity, governance, and
product quality) minus the sum of all concerns in these
dimensions for each year. This is consistent with the approach
followed in a number of prior studies (Graves and Waddock,
1994; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wang and Choi, 2013;
Petrenko et al., 2016).

Independent Variables: Chief Executive Officer Prior
Corporate Social Responsibility Experience and
Board Member Prior Corporate Social Responsibility
Experience

Model Specification and Estimation
Method

Zhu and Chen (2015) measured CEO prior mergers and
acquisitions experience by obtaining the level of mergers and
acquisitions emphasis in their most recent firms before joining
the focal firm. We used a similar approach to measure CEO
prior CSR experience and the board’s prior CSR experience. We
operationalized CEO prior experience by computing the average
CSR score of each firm where the CEO had served in the three
years prior to assuming the CEO position at the focal firm.
We employed the same metric for individual board members,
but then computed the mean within each firm’s board to get a
single measure of board experience for each firm. Consistent with
previous research, we weighted prior decisions by multiplying

Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

A minimum employment of either pooled OLS, the fixed effects
(FE), or the random effects (RE) to panel data is recommended
(Al-Shammari M. et al., 2021). The F-test null is strongly rejected
in our present unbalanced sample, making FE an obvious choice
over pooled OLS. Also, Hausman test null is strongly rejected,
indicating superiority of FE even over RE. However, due to
time-invariant nature of our independent variables, FE drops
both variables. In addition, statistically significant results from
Shapiro-Francia test on the dependent variable supports presence
of non-normal distribution. Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test
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further reveals the presence of heteroscedasticity. Additionally,
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation proves presence of first-order
autocorrelation. Hence, the feasible generalized least squares
(FGLS) regression with heteroscedasticity and panel-specific AR1
autocorrelation is chosen as the appropriate means for analyzing
the aforementioned hypotheses (Al-Shammari et al., 2022b).
In particular, we estimate the following model to predict
CSR as a function of the explanatory variables discussed in the
previous section.

average CEO prior CSR. Missing information is prevalent in case
of both R&D and advertisement expenses. Next, we form group
of firms based upon their CEO prior CSR and board prior CSR
values. We note that firms with positive values of either of the
experiences yield better CSRt+1 on average in the bottom panel
of Table 1. We also observe that the differences between the
means are highly significant as represented by their associated
t-statistics in parentheses. These are the preliminary evidences
in support of our H1 and H2. Further, including lags by a year
to this annual data, both an augmented Dickey-Fuller test with
or without trend and Phillips-Perron test reject the null of unit
root test at 0.1% statistical significance level when CSRt+1 is
the dependent variable. The test results support stationarity or
stability of the CSRt+1 variable.
Table 2 contains the pairwise correlations among the primary
variables of the study. Our first variable of interest which is CEO
prior CSR experience is significantly and positively correlated
with CSR. Board prior CSR is also significantly correlated with
CSR. CEO overconfidence is significant and positively correlated
with CSR as well. Given the patterns and magnitudes of these
inter-correlations, we examined variance inflation factors (VIF)
produced from the main effects of our models to assess the
potential for multicollinearity issues. The VIF values ranged from
1.20 to 3.58, which is less than 10. The mean VIF value is 1.64 is
mean VIF, which is less than 6. Based on the ranges and the mean

CSRit+1 = α + β1 CEO prior CSRit + β2 Board prior CSRit
+ β3 CEO prior CSRit XCEO overconfidenceit
+ β4 Board prior CSRit XCEO overconfidenceit
+ βn Xit + γ1 Industry dummies
+ δ1 Year dummies + εit+1
which i and t stand for an individual firm and specific year,
respectively, in. CSR is a firm’s social performance, X denotes all
other explanatory variables, including lagged CSR, and ε indicates
the error term. We set β2 , β3 and β4 as zero to test the first
hypothesis predicting positive association between CEO prior
CSR and firm CSR. Whereas, β1 , β3 and β4 are set to zero to
test the second hypothesis anticipating Board prior CSR’s positive
influence on a firm’s CSR. Coefficients β3 and β4 are required to
illustrate hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4, respectively, involving
the moderating role of CEO overconfidence.
In case of the independent variables, endogeneity issue is
unlikely because prior experiences have nothing to do with a
focal firm. In other words, previous firms are the sources of both
prior experiences – these experiences have already been earned
even before a CEO or board member joins a focal firm. However,
the moderator variable, CEO overconfidence, may contribute
to such issue. Therefore, both Durbin-Wu-Hausman test and
Wooldridge’s robust score test were resorted to for ensuring that
the observed relationship between CEO overconfidence, CEO
prior CSR experience, board prior CSR experience and firmlevel social performance was not due to unobserved factors
(Al-Shammari M. A. et al., 2021). Respective industry average
is used as an instrument (even for both independent variables),
which predict the dependent variable significantly. In the second
stage regression with CSR as the dependent variable, the null
is not rejected in both tests, implying endogeneity is not an
issue in this case for the sample. Besides, we collect our
dependent and all right-hand-side variables in t + 1 and t,
respectively, because the relationship between dependent and
independent variables may work better with a temporal lag, and
it provides an initial protection against the endogeneity issue
(Al-Shammari et al., 2022a).

TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
Variables

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. A typical
firm has positive means of all variables. Although, a firm shows
comparatively low values of Tobin’s Q, leverage, slack, and all
three intensities. An average board prior CSR is greater than an
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SD

Median

Min.

Max.

CSRt+1

1.56

4.45

1.00

−8.00

18.00

CEO prior CSRt

2.46

3.51

1.40

−4.50

15.20

Board prior CSRt

3.19

1.59

3.31

−1.50

7.80

CEO overconfidencet

1.60

1.95

1.78

−7.03

20.01

CEO tenuret

1.74

0.78

1.79

0.00

3.78

CEO aget

4.03

0.11

4.04

3.61

4.44

CSRt

1.04

4.35

0.00

−9.00

18.00

Tobin’s Qt

0.54

0.39

0.49

−0.21

2.32

Firm aget

3.48

0.60

3.66

1.39

4.14

Sizet

9.32

1.15

9.16

6.19

13.59

Leveraget

0.24

0.16

0.21

0.00

1.03

Slackt

0.11

0.11

0.08

0.00

0.76

Capital intensityt

0.06

0.10

0.03

0.00

1.02

R&D intensityt

0.02

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.68

Advertisement intensityt

0.02

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.47

R&D missingt

0.69

0.46

1.00

0.00

1.00

Advertisement missingt

0.47

0.50

0.00

0.00

CSRt+1

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

M

CSRt+1

1.00

M (CEO prior
CSRt ≤ 0)

M (CEO prior
CSRt > 0)

Difference
(t-stat)

−0.62

2.70

−3.32
(−13.84)

M (Board prior
CSRt ≤ 0)

M (Board prior
CSRt > 0)

Difference
(t-stat)

−1.70

1.79

−3.49
(−7.28)

N = 1,338.
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0.12***
0.21***
0.10***
0.16***
Advertisement missingt

Robustness Check
To ensure the robustness of our results, we reran the analysis
using a substitute measure for social performance, namely z-score
CSR and CSR strengths after controlling for CSR concerns.
As additional robustness checks, we used different measures
for firm size (natural log of firm sales and natural log of
firm assets) and different measures for R&D and advertisement
intensities (first, scaling by sale, and then, scaling by number of
employees). We also ran the analysis by replacing SIC two-digit
industry categories by Fama-French industry classification. These
robustness tests had no effect on the substantive results; the first

*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

0.07***

0.46***
−0.03
−0.15***
0.01
0.11***
−0.04
−0.01
0.12***
0.17***
−0.08***
−0.08***

0.04

0.31***
−0.22***
0.08***
−0.03
0.01
0.08***
0.25***
0.16***
0.00
−0.02
0.12***
0.16***
R&D missingt

0.13***

0.11***

−0.08***

−0.04
0.42***

0.14***
−0.03
−0.16***
−0.08***
0.28***
0.16***
−0.17***
−0.08***
0.06
0.17***
0.14***
Advertisement intensityt

0.14***

−0.10***
0.03

−0.13***
0.08***
0.00
0.34***
0.20***
−0.02
0.00
0.16***
0.21***

0.22***

−0.35***

R&D intensityt

0.24***

0.21***
0.00
−0.09***
0.00
0.07***
0.07**
0.03
−0.21***
−0.03
0.00
Capital intensityt

0.05*

−0.09***
−0.12***
0.37***
0.19***
−0.08***
0.01
0.17***
0.26***
0.16***
0.18***
Slackt

0.04

0.42***
−0.10***

−0.22***
−0.05*
0.07***
−0.09***
−0.15***
−0.04
Leveraget

0.24***
Sizet

−0.04

0.09***
0.23***

0.02

−0.03
0.21***

0.20***
0.14***

0.23***

0.14***

−0.06**

0.07***
0.23***
Firm aget

−0.03
0.20***
0.16***

−0.09***

−0.01

−0.09***
−0.04
0.20***
Tobin’s Qt

0.39***
0.14***
0.17***

−0.02

0.41***
0.07**

0.11***
0.27***
0.84***
CSRt

0.22***

0.40***

−0.03

0.02

−0.09***
0.01
CEO aget

0.10***

−0.08***

0.03
0.11***

−0.02

0.27***

CEO overconfidencet

CEO tenuret

0.25***
0.37***
CEO prior CSRt

Board prior CSRt

CSRt+1
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0.02

16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Variables

TABLE 2 | Pairwise correlation matrix.

VIF value, multicollinearity does not appear to be a significant
problem in the current data.
Table 3 shows the results of our FGLS analysis. In the base
model, Model 1, we included all the control variables, including
the moderator, CEO overconfidence. We then added CEO prior
CSR experiences to create Model 2. Model 3 is built on Model 2
by adding board prior CSR experiences. To create Model 4, we
added the interaction between CEO prior CSR experience and
overconfidence. In Model 5 we added the interaction between
board prior CSR experience and CEO overconfidence to the
Model 4 variables. Consistent with prior studies (Zhu and
Chen, 2015), we interpret our results for first two hypotheses
and last two hypotheses based on the fully specified Model 3
and Model 5 where we included all primary and interaction
variables, respectively.
Our first hypothesis predicts that higher a CEO’s prior CSR
experience, higher the firm’s social performance. FGLS yields a
positive and significant β1 (β = 0.05, ρ < 0.01) in Model 3. Hence,
Model 3 does provide support to hypothesis 1 that suggested a
positive relationship between CEO prior CSR experience and the
focal firm’s CSR.
Again, FGLS yields a positive and significant β2 (β = 0.05,
ρ < 0.10) in Model 3. This result strongly supports hypothesis
2 that predicts a positive impact on focal firm’s CSR of board
prior CSR experience.
As per hypothesis 3, CEO overconfidence is supposed to
positively moderate the relationship between CEO prior CSR and
the focal firm’s CSR. FGLS produces positive and statistically
significant β3 (β = 0.02, ρ < 0.01) in Model 5. Hence,
the fact that CEO overconfidence strengthens the relationship
between CEO prior CSR and a firm’s social performance is fully
supported for the sample.
CEO overconfidence is also assumed to negatively moderate
the relationship between board prior CSR experience and a
firm’s social performance, according to hypothesis 4. The results,
however, show a positive and not significant effect β4 (β = 0.01,
ns) as shown in Model 5 Hence, hypothesis 4 is not supported.
In order to interpret the statistically significant interaction
effect between CEO prior CSR experience and CEO
overconfidence in predicting an average firm’s social
performance, we graph it in Figure 1.
Figure 1 confirms that a firm with 1 sd above mean or mean
CEO prior experience observes better immediate future social
performance compared to its counterparts with 1 sd below mean
CEO prior experience.
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our regressions including industry level average variables like
average industry Tobin’s Q, average industry size, average
industry leverage, average industry slack, average industry capital
intensity, average industry R&D and advertisement intensities.
To avoid any type of recessionary impact from the great
financial crisis of 2007-2009, all regressions were rerun for the
2010-2013 period. First three hypotheses remained supported.

TABLE 3 | Effects of chief executive officer (CEO)/Board prior Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) on CSR and moderating effects of overconfidence.
Variable
CEO prior CSRt
Board prior CSRt
CEO prior CSRt X CEO

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

_

0.05***

0.05***

0.00

0.01

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

_
_

_
_

Model 5

0.05*

0.05**

0.05

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

_

0.02***

0.02***

(0.01)

(0.01)

overconfidence
Board prior CSRt X CEO

Model 4

_

_

_

_

0.01

CEO overconfidencet

0.05**

0.05**

0.04**

0.00

−0.02

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.04)

CEO tenuret

−0.09*

−0.10*

−0.08

−0.07

−0.08

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

0.11

0.16

0.12

−0.01

−0.04

overconfidence

CEO aget

(0.01)

(0.36)

(0.37)

(0.38)

(0.37)

(0.36)

CSRt

0.78***

0.76***

0.77***

0.77***

0.77***

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Tobin’s Qt

−0.04

−0.10

−0.13

−0.11

−0.12

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

(0.14)

Firm aget

0.18***

0.13*

0.10

0.09

0.10

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.07)

0.29***

0.27***

0.27***

0.27***

0.27***

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Leveraget

−0.11

−0.10

−0.20

−0.23

−0.20

(0.22)

(0.23)

(0.25)

(0.24)

(0.24)

Slackt

−0.29

−0.21

−0.34

−0.59

−0.60

(0.45)

(0.50)

(0.52)

(0.52)

(0.52)

Capital intensityt

−0.55

−0.58

−0.37

−0.42

−0.39

(0.45)

(0.46)

(0.49)

(0.48)

(0.49)

R&D intensityt

4.33***

4.28***

4.29***

4.54***

4.45***

(1.08)

(1.33)

(1.34)

(1.44)

(1.44)

Advertisement intensityt

6.30***

5.89***

5.92***

6.00***

6.04***

(1.97)

(1.98)

(2.02)

(2.07)

(2.07)

R&D missingt

0.28**

0.30***

0.28**

0.24**

0.23*

(0.11)

(0.11)

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.12)

−0.05

−0.03

−0.03

−0.02

−0.02

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.14)

−3.95**

−3.65**

−3.41**

−2.85*

−2.67*

Sizet

Advertisement missingt
Intercept
N

DISCUSSION

(1.55)

(1.60)

(1.61)

(1.53)

(1.53)

1,338

1,338

1,338

1,338

1,338

14.16***
(1)

27.41***
(1)

28.31***
(1)

Wald test (compared to)

Drawing on both institutional theory (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell,
1983) and upper echelon theory (e.g., Hambrick and Mason,
1984) we proposed that both CEO and board prior CSR exposure
would positively influence the focal firm’s CSR strategy. We also
hypothesized that CEO overconfidence would have a positive
moderating influence on these relationships. Our study found
a positive and significant relationship between CEO prior CSR
experience and the focal firm’s CSR. Additionally, we found that
overconfidence positively affects this relationship. These results
indicate that overconfident CEOs are more likely than others
to embrace policies that are similar to the policies they have
experienced at previous firms whether as board members or as
CEOs. It adds to our understanding of the literature on policy
migration and inter-organizational imitation.
Our results also indicate that prior CSR experience of the
board has a positive impact on the firm’s CSR. Serving on the
boards of other companies which have high levels of involvement
in CSR activities results in those directors advancing the CSR
agenda in the focal organization as well. This would suggest
that corporate practices diffuse over time and that one of the
mechanisms of such diffusion may be common membership by
those in decision making roles. While we found no moderating
effect of CEO overconfidence on the relationship between CEO
prior CSR experience and CSR, we found a positive and
non-significant moderating relationship between board prior
experience and focal firm CSR. This is clearly an intriguing
result. It is possible that highly overconfident CEOs maybe
willing to be influenced by the board prior CSR experiences for
two reasons. First, the credit for the firm’s CSR activities can
be largely claimed by the CEO. Second, indulging the board’s
preferences with regard to CSR may elicit greater support from
the board for the CEO’s initiatives in areas such as M&As,
thus facilitating the overconfident CEO’s risky actions. That
is, overconfident CEOs might be drawn to bolder marketfocused strategies such as disruptive innovation, mergers and
acquisitions, international alliances, and other risky strategies,
and therefore would need more resources to engage in such
strategies. Such actions would need the support and the approval
of the board. CEOs may be allowing the board members to
influence the firm’s CSR strategy in exchange for support for the
CEO’s strategic decisions in other areas.
Our study makes important contributions to several areas
of the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on
inter-organizational imitation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) by
highlighting the impact of prior CSR experience on the CEO
and board. In doing so, we take a modest step in addressing

Industry dummy variables and year dummy variables are included in all models.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01.

three hypotheses continue to be supported; the fourth hypothesis
is not supported.
A CEO may not be able to practice her/his full power at the
current office in the first year irrespective of prior CSR experience
level. Hence, we rerun all regressions dropping CEOs with just
one year of experience. First three hypotheses still hold strong.
Results related to both hypotheses involving CEO prior
CSR experience remain unchanged even after rerunning all
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FIGURE 1 | Moderating role of chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence in the firm CSR-CEO Prior Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) relationship.

persistence (or lack thereof) of specific strategies from prior
experiences based on the personality traits of the CEO. That
is, certain strategies may be less affected by personality traits
than others. Future research could also examine the status
of the prior firms on which the CEO and the board have
previously served to see whether the status of those firms
(highly prestigious, prominent, profitable) has a moderating
effect on the extent to which the CEO and board experiences in
those companies impacts their subsequent strategic orientations,
priorities, and preferences.
Although there has been increasing research attention on
how boards of directors may influence firms’ strategic decisions
[see review by Westphal and Zajac (2013)], there has been
limited awareness that the directors’ impact on strategy may be
contingent on the personality traits of the CEO. While our finding
that CEO overconfidence moderates the influence of other
directors’ experience on major corporate decisions, namely CSR,
was not significant and contrary to what we predicted, it would
be worth examining whether other salient personality traits of
the CEO may increase or decrease the influence and authority of
the board in certain strategic contexts such as CSR. Further, CEO
overconfidence may significantly affect decision processes and
alter decision outcomes in other strategic contexts. The positive
moderation effect of CEO overconfidence on the relationship
between board prior CSR experiences and the firm’s CSR may
imply a certain ingratiation behavior. Prior research suggests that
overconfidence is almost always present in narcissistic individuals
(McCarthy et al., 2017), and, given the positive coefficient of the
CEO overconfidence in the case of board prior experiences, it
may be the case that narcissistic CEOs may let the board initiate
positive or negative CSR strategies consistent with the board prior

the imbalance in prior literature which has primarily focused on
external determinants of CSR. One possible avenue for future
research is the learning effects and its subsequent performance
implications of prior CSR experience of the CEO and the board.
That is, it is important to examine if CEO and board members
with prior CSR experience create a stronger CSR-performance
relationship than CEOs and board members who have less
experience with CSR.
We also contribute to the growing literature on the impact
of personality traits of organizational leaders on their CSR
engagements (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2011), namely CEO
overconfidence. CEO overconfidence has been recognized as an
increasingly important personality trait that influences a firm’s
strategic orientation (Goel and Thakor, 2008; Andriosopoulos
et al., 2013; Aghazadeh et al., 2018). It has also been found that
most organizational leaders have some degree of overconfidence
(Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Chen et al., 2015). However, CEOs
vary in the extent to which they possess this personality trait and
this variance may have important implications for the strategies
that they choose and the consequent resource commitments they
make (Gerstner et al., 2013; Cragun et al., 2020). Yet, most studies
have focused on the linkages between CEO overconfidence and
market strategies.
Recently, CEO overconfidence has been found to have an
equal impact on non-market strategies as well (Tang et al.,
2015; McCarthy et al., 2017). Overconfidence has been found to
be negatively related to CSR (McCarthy et al., 2017), whereas
narcissism positively affected CSR and, even more interestingly, it
has been found to negatively moderate the relationship between
CSR and firm performance (Petrenko et al., 2016). Yet another
potential avenue for future research is the examination of the
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relationships between CEO/Board prior CSR and the focal firm’s
CSR. We suspect that CEO overconfidence is only one of many
different personality characteristics that affect executive decision
making. Thus we believe that the integration of personality
theories with executive decision making behaviors will become
another productive area for ongoing research.

CSR exposure and their CSR preferences in exchange for
a greater freedom for the CEO to engage in other bolder
actions that would not necessarily benefit shareholders. Zhu
and Chen (2015) for example found that narcissistic CEOs are
more drawn to bold actions such as mergers and acquisitions.
By giving the board more authority in CSR decisions, CEOs
may secure the board’s support to engage in other strategies
such as M&As.

Limitations
As with all studies, interpreting our current work requires
recognition of several potential limitations. For example, data
availability problems restricted our sample to a small subset
of Fortune 500 firms which restricts the generalizability of
our results. All of the firms in our sample are large, publicly
traded corporations. Additional studies will need to determine
whether the current results generalize across smaller firms
with different ownership structures. Our operationalization of
CEO and board prior experience looked at only the most
recent three years of executives’ experience. As a result,
we can only speculate about the influence of early career
experiences in shaping managerial preferences. More finegrained information about the career paths of individual
executives might shed light interesting developmental process
and influence that have long lasting effects on an executives’
behavior and values in later stages if their careers. Our
reliance on the KLD database as the data source for firm’s
CSR activities, our results come with the inherent limitations
of the KLH data. Future studies, therefore, could use more
direct measures of CSR or complementary measures from other
sources. Finally, the overconfidence measures we use is based
on unobtrusive indicators due to the difficulty of obtaining
CEO responses to surveys. Using richer and more direct
measures of CEO overconfidence in future studies could help
generate a more nuanced understanding of behavioral differences
between CEOs who are overconfident versus those who are
merely confident.

CONCLUSION
Organization researchers have long been interested in explaining
why organizations become similar to each other over time
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zhu and Chen, 2015). One
explanation for increasing isomorphism in organizational fields is
that managers remain committed to certain paths and strategies
they have experienced and applied throughout their careers
(Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Yang et al., 2011; Zhu and
Chen, 2015). CEOs and Directors have prior experiences as either
CEOs, board members, or C-Suit members prior to their current
positions at the focal firm. These experiences have been shown to
influence their subsequent actions and decisions. Zhu and Chen
(2015), for example, found that prior merger and acquisition
experiences of CEOs and boards influence their current firm’s
M&A strategies. We have extended the exploration of CEO
and Board prior experience is to examine how prior experience
impacts the performance effect of CSR. We would expect that
when the board members have higher CSR experiences, they
would be able to increase the consistency of the firm’s CSR
strategies, balance the pace of CSR engagements, and align these
strategies with the best interests of shareholders and other key
stakeholders. The same logic may apply to the CEO and board’s
prior CSR experiences over a broad range of domains such as
innovation, international expansion, and perhaps even creative
disruption strategies.
Our work also highlights the need for greater understanding of
the micro foundations of executive behaviors and actions. To date
inadequate attention has been focused on the possibility that CEO
personality traits may have an effect on how prior experience
impacts executives subsequent actions. Some personality traits
may either amplify or suppress the effects executives prior
experiences at other firms. In the present study, we examine
the implications of CEO prior CSR experiences, board prior
CSR experiences, and CEO overconfidence on the focal firm’s
CSR. Specifically, we examine whether CEO/board prior CSR
experiences will influence the focal firm’s CSR, and whether
CEO overconfidence as a fundamental personality trait among
organizational leaders will have a moderating effect on the
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